The Rise of the Provinces, 29th Dec., 2010.

Shirk, Susan L. "The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China." University of California Press. 1993.  Page 189.

Decentralizing reforms changed the career incentives of provincial officials. In the past the focus of their ambitions had been the central party-state bureaucracy in Beijing. But after 1980 so much of the economic action occurred at the provincial level and provincial leaders exercised such national influence that some politicians from the most dynamic regions chose to remain in the provinces instead of climbing the ladder to Beijing. One well-known example was [Xuanping Ye (叶选平)], governor of Guangdong province, who turned down attractive job offers in Beijing (one to be a vice premier of the State Council) to stay in Guangdong; he was fired in 1991. Another example is [Qinglin Jia (贾庆林)], deputy party secretary of Fujian, who turned down a ministry post in Beijing in the hopes that he would become provincial governor instead (Kuan 1990). To the degree that the allure of national position has faded, the center has lost some leverage over the behavior of provincial officials.